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Whitby: A “New Look” at Cold War Maritime Defense—The Royal Canadian Navy

A “NEW LOOK” AT COLD WAR MARITIME DEFENSE
The Royal Canadian Navy’s Seaward Defence Report and the
Threat of the Missile-Firing Submarine, 1955
Michael Whitby

A

ntisubmarine warfare (ASW) during the First and Second World Wars
featured a relentless struggle of measure versus countermeasure as opposing forces sought a decisive edge. Examples abound from both world wars:
unrestricted submarine warfare bred convoys; surface attacks by submarines
spawned Q-ships; hull-mounted sonar triggered night surface attacks by U-boats;
the so-called Black Pit in the North Atlantic demanded very-long-range (VLR)
patrol aircraft; acoustic homing torpedoes begot towed decoy noisemakers; and
so forth. Some measures required immediate response, while others induced
more-subtle reactions; some required strategic adjustments, while others could
be met by innovative tactics.
The measure-countermeasure pattern continued into Cold War ASW, during which improvements to the performance,
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in ASW—explained the problem as follows:
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“Confronted with quiet submarines of long endurance, a sufficiently accurate
means of navigation, and suitable weapons, a defense against shore bombardment by submarines becomes a huge problem. Even the partial defense of a
long coastline requires a very large effort.”1
The U.S. Navy and the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) arguably were the Allied navies that the missile threat impacted most. During the first years of the
Cold War, the Atlantic Ocean had provided a moatlike buffer against maritime
nuclear threats. Soviet strategic bombers could reach North America, but direct
nuclear attack from the sea was thought to be beyond the Soviets’ capability. That
changed when naval intelligence organizations forecast that the Soviets would
have the capability to deploy missile-firing submarines (SSGs) within range of
North American targets as soon as the late 1950s.2 The prospect of enemy missile
boats lurking within range of American and Canadian defense installations and
population centers—a Cold War PAUKENSCHLAG, or Барабанный Бой, if you
will—alarmed naval planners.3 Particularly troubling would be attacks on the
bases and command centers of the Strategic Air Command (SAC), which was
charged with delivering a nuclear response.
SSGs were a game changer, and planners and operators scrambled to develop countermeasures. In the spring of 1955, the RCN’s initial response was
enunciated in the only recently declassified Seaward Defence Report. Described
by one officer as a “new look” at the maritime threat confronting Canada, the
study concluded that then-emerging sound-surveillance systems were the key
to countering SSGs, and it enunciated the types of forces that should be used to
supplement the systems and how they should be employed.4 In short, the Seaward Defence Report provided a blueprint for how to conduct seaward defense
in the nuclear age.
The report is an invaluable historical tool. It reveals how a midsize navy with
comparatively limited resources charged with defending a long coastline and
valuable strategic targets proposed to cope with dramatically changing circumstances. It also shows what Canadian naval planners understood about the nature
of the Soviet threat in the mid-1950s, as well as their ability to counter it, at the
moment they confronted the challenge. And it demonstrates how they sought to
use these circumstances to further their ambitions. Importantly, the report also
allows a peek at probable American thinking, since the almost seamless cooperation that then existed between the RCN and the U.S. Navy suggests that their
plans may have been similar. Finally, examination of follow-on exercises allows
testing of the report’s hypothesis. The Seaward Defence Report, then, presents an
intriguing case study of how Cold War naval planners adapted to Soviet offensive
innovations in the maritime sphere.
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THE HISTORICAL AND STRATEGIC CONTEXT
In the mid-1950s, Canadian planning revolved around overlapping maritime
defense partnerships in the North Atlantic. (While the Pacific was not ignored,
the North Atlantic dominated thinking.) Since Canada was a founding member
of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the RCN had obligations to
the Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic (SACLANT), including responsibility
for the Canadian Atlantic Sub-Area (CANLANT). The SACLANT commitment
was a cornerstone of RCN planning.
However, this relationship was matched, and occasionally overshadowed, by
Canada’s close defense partnership with the United States. Since the 1940 Ogdensburg Agreement, Canada and the United States had cemented their military
cooperation through vehicles such as the Permanent Joint Board on Defense and
the Military Cooperation Committee. The relationship was not allowed to wither
after the war, and in February 1947 the two countries announced their intention
to continue with joint cooperation for continental defense. Demonstrating the
intimacy of the partnership, that August the RCN’s Director of Naval Plans noted
that “in view of the vital importance of the defense of North American war making ability in a future war, RCN planning will in future be largely based on the
Naval forces now envisaged in the [U.S./Canada] Basic Security Plan. This will
make desirable the standardization of the RCN and the USN by the time that the
Basic Security Plan must be ready for immediate implementation.”5
The creation of NATO in April 1949 led to the establishment of the CanadaU.S. Regional Planning Group (CUSRPG), which functioned in part as a liaison between the two North American navies and other NATO forces under
SACLANT. Importantly, although CUSRPG was part of NATO, for security
reasons the United States and Canada often were unwilling to share the details
of continental defense with European allies, in particular regarding information
about sound-surveillance systems.6 Beyond these relationships, the RCN preserved its umbilical cord with the Royal Navy (RN), although the U.S. Navy was
emerging as Canada’s predominant maritime partner.
In the mid-1950s, the RCN was in the early stages of a substantial modernization of its A/S assets. The destroyers and frigates that formed the backbone
of the postwar fleet were British designs of Second World War vintage.7 Destroyer strength consisted of seven Tribal-class and two each of the Valentine- and
Crescent-class intermediate designs; two of the latter had their A/S capability
significantly enhanced through a conversion similar to the Royal Navy’s Type
15 program, while another seven underwent the more limited Type 16 upgrade.8
Sixteen River-class frigates were scheduled to undergo the Prestonian conversion,
which, like the destroyer modernization, provided significant upgrades to their
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sonar, radar, weaponry, and other systems. The RCN’s lone aircraft carrier, the
light fleet carrier (CVL) Magnificent, also was of Second World War design, as
were its Grumman A/S-3 Avenger and Hawker FB-11 Sea Fury aircraft. These
ships and aircraft could prosecute moderately fast submarines but were challenged
by improved types with performance similar to those undergoing the U.S. Navy’s
new Greater Underwater Propulsion Power Program (i.e., GUPPY) conversions.9
However, enhanced capability was on the horizon. As part of the increase in
defense spending that came with the escalation of the Cold War in the late 1940s,
the RCN was building seven St. Laurent–class destroyer escorts, with seven similar Restigouche-class ships to follow. Scheduled to begin commissioning in 1955,
these ships ultimately would be considered among the finest A/S platforms in the
world. The new destroyers were to be accompanied by ships of the recently approved Vancouver-class frigate program, which was intended to provide replacements for the Prestonians as oceangoing escorts. In addition, the significantly
modernized CVL HMCS Bonaventure, equipped with advanced angled-deck,
mirror-landing, and steam-catapult systems, was due to commission in 1956,
with an air group composed of Grumman CS2F Tracker A/S aircraft and McDonnell F2H-3 Banshee fighters.10 Strides also were being made in the development
of ASW helicopters. Submarine strength was limited to two A-class boats on loan
from Britain’s Royal Navy. The fleet was rounded out by the light cruisers Ontario
and Québec, which were used as training ships and designated for reserve if war
broke out, as well as a cadre of minesweepers. Although the fleet possessed the
elements of a balanced capability, ASW was the RCN’s primary focus, and the
planners mulling over new concepts in naval warfare in the spring of 1955 did
so with the confidence that they were working from the basis of an increasingly
effective A/S component.11
Under the SACLANT war plans in place in the mid-1950s, if conflict erupted
Canada’s most potent A/S assets would be deployed immediately away from
home waters to the eastern Atlantic (EASTLANT) under the NATO strategy
emphasizing support to Europe. The aircraft carrier and fifteen escorts would
head overseas to form the nucleus of a joint RCN/RN A/S hunting group
based in Brest, France. The remaining oceangoing escorts were committed to
the protection of the transatlantic shipping that would reinforce Europe. Only
minesweepers would be allocated to Canadian waters, with the Algerine class
escorting coastal convoys while the smaller Bangor and Bay classes fulfilled local
minesweeping tasks.12
Although the Canadian government recognized that circumstances might
preclude the deployment of the core of its A/S strength overseas, the European
commitment remained paramount. But the new notions associated with seaward
defense would challenge that policy.
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol73/iss4/8
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THE SEAWARD DEFENCE REPORT
The Seaward Defence Report originated from a December 1954 request from the
Chiefs of Staff Committee that the navy investigate “the nature and extent” of
Canada’s seaward defenses at various stages of a war at sea. The focus was to be
on the period 1958–62 and, reflecting NATO’s conception of a two-stage war—
opening with a thirty-day nuclear exchange, followed by a period of conventional
warfare—it was to examine requirements “on M-day, M plus 30 days, and after
M plus 30 days.”13
This spawned the Seaward Defence Committee, composed of the senior officers at the head of the warfare and planning branches at Naval Service Headquarters (NSHQ) in Ottawa. The Assistant Chief of Naval Staff (ACNS) (Plans),
Commodore D. L. Raymond, led the group, with the ACNSs (Warfare) and (Air),
Commodores Kenneth L. Dyer and W. L. M. Brown, respectively, and the Director of Naval Plans and Operations (DNPO), Captain William M. Landymore,
the other members. A working group chaired by Landymore, with officers from
NSHQ’s antisubmarine, aviation, communications, and navigation directorates,
did the spadework preparing the numerous specialized studies that formed the
backbone of the report.14
Taking four months to complete, the study ultimately spanned some two hundred pages, including twenty-eight papers and thirteen annexes. Tight security
shrouded the report, which was protected on a strict need-to-know basis owing
to the “special security regulations” that protected information pertaining to
sound-surveillance systems.15
THE CONCEPT
The “new look” was driven by the nature of the threat that would confront the
RCN at the end of the decade. On the basis of shared intelligence, including “current American Canadian Agreed Intelligence papers,” it was acknowledged that
in the 1958–62 time frame the Soviets would have the capability to attack the
Canadian coast with aircraft, surface forces, and submarines.16 The report graded
these threats from “improbable” to “probable,” as follows:
(a) The following forms of attack are considered improbable:
		

(i) Attack by surface forces, by virtue of almost certain prospect of detection
and destruction

		 (ii) Attack by air on maritime targets other than major ports, due to there being
other targets of greater strategic importance
		 (iii) Attack inside local defenses by oceangoing submarines, due to the greater
risk of detection
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(b) The following forms of attack are considered possible:
		 (i) Commando-style attacks launched from submarines outside local defenses
		 (ii) Attacks by small battle units launched from submarines outside local
defenses
		 (iii) Minelaying by clandestine means in approaches to defended areas
(c) The following forms of attack are considered probable:
		 (i) Torpedo attacks from submarines on coastal convoys, in focal areas or on
coastal routes
		 (ii) Minelaying from submarines on coastal shipping routes in focal areas and
harbor approaches
		 (iii) Minelaying from submarines in approaches to defended areas
		 (iv) Missile attacks launched from submarines
		 (v) Air attacks on the major ports17

With the exception of missile attacks by submarines and air attacks on
major ports, these threats fell within the bounds of the traditional and were
almost identical to assessments made during the Second World War. Giving
priority to the probable threats and acknowledging the primary responsibility
of the Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) for air defense, the Seaward Defence
Report zeroed in on the submarine threat.18 It enumerated three main naval
tasks:
(i) To deny enemy submarines access to waters from which they can effectively
launch guided missiles
(ii) To provide protection to shipping within the Canadian coastal areas against
submarine attack
(iii) To provide protection to Canadian harbors and approach channels against penetration and all forms of attack from enemy submarines19

Given the gravity of the threat, the report was concerned mainly with missilefiring submarines. The RCN estimated that by 1960 the Soviets would be capable
of deploying eight long-range submarines to the Atlantic coast and six to the
Pacific coast, and they accepted British intelligence that the “Z” or Zulu-class
long-range boats would be capable of launching missiles. On this basis they
determined that the “most recent estimate available of the capability during the
period under review is that submarines will be able to launch a missile a distance
of 500 miles and that they will be able to control over 200 miles. A second submarine operating in conjunction with the launching submarine could increase
the controlled range to 400 miles.”20
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol73/iss4/8
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Interestingly, even though USS Nautilus’s initial exploits were well known,
the report made no reference to nuclear-powered submarines and the immense
capability they might bring to strategic or A/S roles.21 Regarding the missiles
SSGs would carry, intelligence sources concluded that the Soviets “had available
an improved V-1 type with a high explosive warhead” and “a larger twin pulse
Jet V-1 type.” Moreover, it was understood that the Soviet Union “had reached a
point in weapon technology at which it was capable of producing a wide variety
of weapon types and nuclear weapons for weapons other than bombs.”22 The threat
from the sea was serious: “The improved range, speed, and accuracy of the subsonic pilotless aircraft, which could be ready for mass production in 1955, would
greatly increase the number of good targets for submarine-launched attack. In
about 1958 the estimated nuclear warhead yield will approach compatibility with
the estimated accuracy of the weapon system and would greatly increase the likelihood of its use against such targets as air bases and coastal port facilities.”23 With
the possible exception of the number of boats the Soviets would be able to deploy
to North American coasts by 1960, these estimates proved accurate.24
COURSES OF ACTION
So, what to do? The challenge for A/S forces was driven by the necessity to destroy
SSGs before they launched their missiles; the value of dispatching them afterward
paled in significance. The hunt was made more difficult because A/S forces were
seeking individual, free-ranging submarines that were attempting to evade detection, instead of ones lying in wait for convoys or patrolling established shipping
lanes—there would be no “flaming datum” of the traditional variety.25 Complicating the problem was that since the Canadian seaward-defense zone now would
extend to the range of sound-surveillance systems (i.e., hundreds of miles out to
sea) the area to be defended would expand by thousands of square miles—and
this in the notoriously poor oceanographic conditions of the Canadian northwest
Atlantic. The conventional solution would be to use carrier hunter-killer (HUK)
groups or long-range maritime-patrol aircraft (MPA)—conventional submarines
dedicated to ASW (designated SSKs) were just coming into their own—but
without the advantage of intelligence like that provided by direction finding and
ULTRA during the Battle of the Atlantic the task of finding individual submarines
in the vast, open ocean would be difficult indeed.26
For Canada’s senior naval planners, the solution to this complex A/S problem
lay with pioneering sound-surveillance systems. These, it was thought, would
“give the earliest possible warning of impending attack” and “enable our forces
to locate and destroy the attackers.”27 Although the systems were still in the early
stages of development, Canadians had familiarity with them through informational exchange agreements with both the Americans and the British. Moreover,
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2020
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in November 1952 the U.S. State Department had approached Canada for permission to site a surveillance station on Sable Island off Nova Scotia to fill a gap
in the planned network along the Atlantic seaboard. After initial surveys revealed
Sable Island to be unsuitable, the two countries agreed to build a facility at Shelburne on Nova Scotia’s south coast.28
A high-level report described what became known as Station Fox: “The Sound
Research Station at Shelburne is planned to consist of an array of special devices
laid on the ocean floor in 1,000 fathoms of water, approximately 100 miles at
sea, with a tail cable laid from the array to Shelburne, where the equipment and
personnel would be housed. In addition to the deep water array, a shallow water
array is being laid for the purpose of research into the conditions met in cold,
shallow waters peculiar to the Canadian coastal areas.”29
Embracing the promise the technology represented, RCN planners made it the
foundation of the philosophy espoused in the Seaward Defence Report. The new
seaward-defense concept envisioned a combination of two sound-surveillance
systems. Under the designations then used by Canadian naval planners, these
were the LOFAR (for low-frequency analysis and recording) system, developed
by the Americans, and the CORSAIR (for co-relation of sound analysis and
recording) system under initial investigation in the United Kingdom.30 The
LOFAR system enabled the detection of submarines through the capture of
low-frequency acoustics by arrays of hydrophones extending far out to sea on
the ocean floor. The arrays were connected to naval shore facilities where the
acoustic data were analyzed digitally, with any resultant target data passed to
operational headquarters for prosecution. In 1950, personnel involved with the
U.S. Navy’s Project HARTWELL, which was investigating the viability of a longrange acoustic detection system, recommended the detection of submarines by
using real-time spectral analysis of radiated sound energy as holding the most
promise for a future A/S detection system. That November, the Western Electric
Company was contracted to develop the technology; it assigned the work to its
research organization at Bell Telephone Laboratories. Work proceeded quickly
and the first operational evaluation began in April 1952, with a forty-hydrophone
array installed in two hundred fathoms from Eleuthera in the Bahamas. The test
proved so successful that the U.S. Navy immediately called for the establishment
of a nine-station chain along the eastern coast of the United States, including the
future Station Fox.31
The British CORSAIR system was more of an unknown. The Admiralty
Research Laboratory had begun to work it up only in 1952 and oceanographic
evaluation still was under way, so the Seaward Defence Report acknowledged
that it was in “its very earliest stages for which no evaluation information is
available.”32
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol73/iss4/8
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The Seaward Defence Report explained the differences between the two systems. The LOFAR system was “a network of surveillance stations strategically
sited over the ocean approaches to the Coast,” built to form “a surveillance belt
which will detect and locate snorkeling submarines and thereby assist the ASW
forces in the protection of coastal shipping and defense against submarines capable of launching attack weapons against the mainland.” Spread evenly along
the coast, the stations of the network would form “a surveillance belt about 500
miles to seaward.” Performance would be affected by many variables, including
oceanography and the topography of the ocean floor; however, “ranges against
snorting submarines up to 500 miles may be experienced under favorable conditions on some bearings while on others it might not exceed 150 miles.”33 The
systems would produce the best results against snorkeling boats; “[s]hould the
submarine be on the surface or proceeding [submerged] on main motors, the
detection capability is drastically reduced.” CORSAIR, on the other hand, “has
been developed to determine the accurate location of submarines in comparatively shallow waters off the North Western European continental shelf by means
of hydrophones connected to a shore station.” Expected ranges were far less than
for LOFAR; preliminary evaluation indicated that “a submarine may be detected
snorting out to ranges of 50 miles” and “a submerged submarine doing 4 knots on
motors has been detected up to ranges of 10 miles.” Bearing accuracy would be
superior; however, unlike LOFAR, which could identify individual submarines by
their unique “signatures,” CORSAIR would be unable to provide specific targetclassification information.34
The report concluded that one system could backstop the other. The authors
envisioned an overlapping network of LOFAR and CORSAIR installations.
With LOFAR, the U.S. Navy proposed siting stations two hundred miles apart
to cover the required area and provide a degree of overlap to enable cross bearings
to be obtained for contacts. Following that model—the only one in existence, after
all—and taking “known conditions” into account, the Canadian report projected a
network of five LOFAR arrays on the Atlantic coast, to be located off Sable Island;
the southern and eastern extremities of the Grand Banks; Bonavista Bay, Newfoundland; and Hamilton Inlet, Labrador (see map 1). Some of these requirements
already had been addressed: Station Fox at Shelburne covered the area seaward of
Sable Island, and the RCN was aware of U.S. plans to site a shallow-water station
at Argentia, Newfoundland, to cover the southern Grand Banks. The three arrays
required on the Pacific coast would be located off Cape Cook at the northwest
extremity of Vancouver Island and at Cape Saint James and Cape Knox at the
southern and northern points of the Queen Charlotte Islands (see map 2).35
Shallow-water CORSAIR arrays would provide “a ‘road block’ inside the coverage obtained by the long range LOFAR system.”36 The report did not specify
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2020
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MAP 1
THE PROPOSED EAST COAST SOUND-SURVEILLANCE SYSTEM

The large arcs represent LOFAR coverage; the small circles depict CORSAIR coverage.
Source: CNS, “Underwater Surveillance Requirements.”

the number of CORSAIR stations required, but the accompanying charts gave a
theoretical projection of as many as fifteen arrays on the east coast and five on the
west. These would monitor the approaches to the Strait of Belle Isle, the Strait of
Canso, and the Bay of Fundy on the Atlantic coast, and Dixon Entrance, Queen
Charlotte Sound, and the Strait of Juan de Fuca on the Pacific.37
Although the planners went “all in” on sound surveillance, they did not neglect
the need for other detection technologies. In particular, since they presumed that
Soviet submarine commanders would have to communicate with their headquarters
before launching a missile attack, reliable direction-finding and electronic countermeasures (ECM) capabilities would be essential. Nonetheless, the LOFAR/CORSAIR combination would constitute the primary trip wire, and it promised to “provide the necessary warning to cover the seaward approaches to our coastal areas.”38
FORCE REQUIREMENTS
The Seaward Defence Report considered in great detail the nature of forces required to intercept SSGs using the information provided by sound surveillance.
The situation confronting the planners was unprecedented; although the RCN
had plenty of experience hunting submarines off the Atlantic coast in both world
wars, never before had it faced a threat as grave as the missile-firing submarine.
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol73/iss4/8
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MAP 2
PROPOSED WEST COAST SOUND-SURVEILLANCE SYSTEM

Source: CNS, “Underwater Surveillance Requirements.”

Consequently, the report’s authors understood that to avoid a catastrophic
nuclear scenario, A/S forces required the capability to prosecute any contact
swiftly. This placed a reliance on “offensive support” to the sound-surveillance
system. The report explained it this way: The nature of the threat, coupled with
the long-range detection capability of LOFAR, defined the characteristics required in offensive supporting units. These were as follows:
(i) Ability to locate the submarine as near as possible to the point of first detection
(ii) Ability to attack and destroy the submarine, with the smallest possible time delay,
by day or night, in any weather
(iii) Ability to patrol continuously the outer limits of the detection arc39

Mobility was key, requiring forces to have the ability “to locate, hold, attack,
and destroy the submarine”—quickly. The RCAF’s MPAs would form the backbone of the system, and they would require “all weather and long endurance
qualities.”40 Here, Canada was in good shape. The majority of the RCAF’s maritimepatrol squadrons were equipped with the Lockheed P2V-7 Neptune, which the
report suggested “would provide the best type for the roles envisaged.”41 But the
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2020
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Neptunes were only a temporary stand-in until the VLR Canadair CL-28 Argus,
arguably the most effective MPA of its generation, entered service in 1957. When
the Arguses became operational, naval CS2F Trackers would supplement the
RCAF effort by flying inshore patrols from shore bases or the carrier.42
Despite its substantial capability, the air umbrella required seagoing support.
The Second World War experience had shown that aircrews found it nearly impossible to confirm the results of attacks on submerged submarines, and the report concluded that since “the final destruction of the [missile-firing] submarine
must be assured, in this task both aircraft and ships are required.” The authors
determined that the ship designated for seaward defense “must be capable of
high speed (say 30 knots), it must have long endurance at medium speeds, and it
must be designed primarily to operate effectively under North Atlantic weather
conditions.” Other desired features included superior sea-keeping qualities; the
ability to operate sonar at high tactical speed; gun armament capable of destroying submarines and providing antiaircraft defense; effective A/S weaponry; radar
and communications systems able to control helicopters and provide long-range
air warning; and, because of the expected long duration of patrols, a high level of
comfort and habitability.43
The Second World War–era destroyers that then formed the most potent
element of the RCN’s A/S force had the speed and punch required, but lacked
endurance. The River-class frigates, Bangor- and Algerine-class minesweepers,
and Bird-class patrol boats that formed the remainder of the force were deemed
wholly inadequate. The report’s authors thought the RCN had the solution in
hand in the form of the new escorts about to join the fleet: “The destroyer of St.
Laurent type with speed, sea-keeping qualities, if provided with an adequate gun
armament, would most nearly meet the envisaged operational requirement.”44
How would this combination of air and surface forces, cued by sound surveillance, locate and destroy missile boats? At the time it was thought that, to launch
its missiles, a submarine would have to surface for little more than three minutes;
however, the estimated duration grew over time.45 Given current assessments of
battery capacity, it was estimated that a submerged submarine would be able to
penetrate about 175 miles into the three-hundred-mile LOFAR detection zone
before it had to expose itself to detection from sound surveillance by snorkeling. From that point, “a submarine would be required to transit the remaining
55 miles to an optimal firing position at snorkeling depth or on the surface. At a
snorting speed of 10 knots, time of transit would be approximately 5½ hours.”46
Owing to the probability that submarines would be vulnerable only once
they were well within the detection zone, a “perimeter type patrol” was deemed
unsuitable; instead surface forces should be positioned within the LOFAR zone.
Patrol areas for fixed-wing aircraft could be more variable and reserve aircraft
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol73/iss4/8
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could be held in readiness at their airfields. In terms of numbers, it was thought
that a “four ship support force for each LOFAR installation provides an efficient
unit,” which meant a force of twenty-four dedicated surface vessels on the east
coast and twelve on the west coast, for a total of thirty-six St. Laurents. For fixedwing aircraft, the minimum number required for the east coast was calculated to
be six on patrol and six at readiness, with half those numbers in the Pacific. These
numbers increased dramatically when maintenance and training requirements
were taken into account.47
Although mainly concerned with countering missile boats, the Seaward
Defence Report touched on tangential aspects of navy policy and operations.
Perhaps most importantly, although it did not question sacrosanct SACLANT
plans, the threat from missile boats raised the possibility that Canada might have
to reconsider sending the bulk of its A/S forces overseas to EASTLANT at the
outset of any conflict. The report also considered the implications of the U.S.
Navy / Air Force Lamplight study into requirements for the continental air defense of North America. The report noted that some of the warning systems the
American study recommended would complement the seaward-defense plan,
and suggested that RCN escorts could contribute as air-defense picket ships,
“both by providing information to the system and by acting offensively on the
information provided by it.” This meant the ships would require sophisticated
air-defense capability.48
Communications, command-and-control organization, base requirements,
and other vital factors also received consideration. In terms of sustaining seagoing forces, the RCN possessed only limited underway-replenishment capability
and no fast oilers; however, the committee thought this unnecessary for warships
operating in the LOFAR zone—which would seem to fly in the face of its stated
requirement for the ships to have long endurance.49 On the other hand, the committee recognized that A/S helicopters could play a critical role, either attacking
contacts located closer inshore or operating from a dedicated carrier.50
Mine clearance received considerable attention. Recent experience in the Korean War and ongoing intelligence emphasized the Soviets’ strong commitment
to mine warfare and their use of moored, ground, and drifting mines with varied
firing mechanisms, including contact and influence (magnetic, acoustic, and
pressure), combined with various delayed fuses. In view of this threat, the committee recommended that the “main ports” of Halifax, Sydney, and Esquimalt/
Victoria be kept open at all times, with forces available to clear “lesser ports”
within forty-eight hours.51
In terms of the traditional static components of seaward defense, the report
questioned whether there was any further need for coastal-artillery batteries
and suggested that net defenses could be reduced. The authors thought that
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controlled minefields and indicator loops still had utility, but the need for them
could be reconsidered once the sound-surveillance system was developed.52 In
terms of coastal convoys, the report suggested they would not be required on
Canada’s west coast but “will be required on the East Coast unless long range
detection devices with adequate supporting forces can be developed.”53 In many
areas, therefore, the potential of the new sound-surveillance system promised a
transformation in seaward defense.
THE SHORTCOMINGS
Notwithstanding the presentation of a realistic concept to counter missile-firing
submarines, the Seaward Defence Report suffered a number of shortcomings.
Some of these can be attributed to patchy intelligence or a lack of concrete information about the actual capability of sound-surveillance systems, but others
stemmed from oversights or flawed thinking. In his cover letter, the Chief of the
Naval Staff (CNS), Vice Admiral E. Rollo Mainguy, explained that the report took
no account of the costs or personnel implications associated with the concept.54
Despite this, the authors stated some specific requirements, such as additional
surveillance arrays, and the precise numbers needed to bring air and seagoing
forces up to the proposed strength. Naval leaders also used the report’s findings
as a rationale for procuring additional St. Laurents. Consequently, the lines were
blurred on whether the plan was a conceptual think piece or a road map to a
specific objective.
Certain operational factors also were not taken into account. There was no
statement regarding when the forces providing offensive support to the soundsurveillance system would be deployed. Would they be on constant patrol as
a deterrent, or deploy only in an emergency? That, of course, would affect the
numbers of ships and aircraft required, but also would depend on Soviet capabilities. Would the Soviets mount standing patrols in peacetime or only surge
into missile-firing positions just before or at the outbreak of any conflict, thus
likely providing a degree of warning? As mentioned previously, the report also
surprisingly made no mention of the possibility of the Soviets adopting nuclear
propulsion; if they could mate nuclear warheads with missiles, surely they could
do the same with nuclear propulsion and submarines. By ignoring such issues,
the report lost an element of rationality. As will be seen, senior defense officials
did take these factors, and others, into account.
There was subtext to the Seaward Defence Report, which may help to explain
its deficiencies. Since its establishment in 1910, the RCN had struggled to thrive
in the face of government and public indifference. With budgets tightening with
the end of the Korean conflict, the report offered an opportunity to allay the
impact of cuts on the navy. Continental air defense was a primary reason the
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol73/iss4/8
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RCAF captured a major portion of the defense budget. By inserting a maritime
component into the continental-air-defense equation in the form of the missilefiring submarine, naval leaders hoped to obtain a greater share of the financial
pot. In his cover letter to the report, Admiral Mainguy emphasized that vital
targets within the range of SSGs “may be in just as much danger from thermonuclear attack delivered by submarine as from the same attack delivered by
aircraft.”55 Surely, when the specter of nuclear war lay at the forefront of defense
considerations and was very much in the public eye, the government could not
ignore the threat of nuclear attack from the sea? Naval leaders clearly hoped that
their seaward-defense concept would enable them to take advantage of a real and
substantial national concern and affirm the navy’s increased relevance to continental defense. It also presented an opportunity to upgrade the fleet. Although
the recently approved Vancouver-class frigate program promised to deliver a
useful oceangoing escort, the senior staff had become concerned by its limited
performance and lack of general-purpose capability. The Seaward Defence Report
made the case for replacing the Vancouvers with additional St. Laurents, which
would strengthen the fleet.
Although the report’s authors did not express these ambitions directly, they
clearly were in play. Given the chronic uncertainty that had shrouded much of the
RCN’s history, it is hard to blame the authors for playing these cards.56
THE U.S. NAVY’S APPROACH
The U.S. Navy also grappled with the SSG threat. An attack-at-source approach
by carrier strike forces against Soviet submarine bases and the use of HUKs on
barrier patrols were key elements of its existing ASW plans; however, like the
RCN, the U.S. Navy envisioned sound-surveillance systems as “the most promising solution” to SSGs. As a December 1954 report to the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) from the Anti-Submarine Plans and Policies Group explained,
HUKs “were not created to search wide areas of ocean in the hopes of discovering
an enemy submarine.” “It is our earnest hope,” the report continued, “that the
LOFAR stations which form our Sound Surveillance System in the Atlantic and
Pacific will furnish us with the necessary operational intelligence and will give
us the advance warning that we need to meet the threat of a mass nuclear guided
missile attack launched from submarines.”57
The report referenced exercises using MPA/destroyer teams to chase down
contacts detected by sound surveillance, while carrier HUK groups patrolled
beyond the range of the detection system farther out to sea.58 Although it is not
known whether the two allies consulted one another at this early stage of the SSG
problem—it seems likely that they did, given the cooperation over Station Fox
and other matters—the concept showed that USN thinking paralleled that of the
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RCN; the main difference was that the RCN was prepared to position its carrier
group inside the LOFAR detection zone. Beyond this overall tactical harmony,
the United States, like Canada, was shifting more of its A/S focus from overseas
to home waters in response to the SSG threat; in October 1955, a senior Canadian official reported that the U.S. Navy had reassigned forty-four destroyers and
destroyer escorts from EASTLANT (headquartered near London, England) and
IBERLANT (Lisbon, Portugal) to WESTLANT (Norfolk, Virginia).59
The fact that the U.S. Navy had dozens of escorts to shuttle among theaters
underscores the greatest difference between the two navies: although the RCN
could match its ally in terms of quality, it paled with regard to quantity. The
U.S. Navy simply had the ability, and willingness, to devote more resources to
the SSG problem. For example, in the summer of 1956 the U.S. Navy’s Project
Nobska study emphasized the potential of nuclear-powered submarines (SSNs)
for ASW.60 SSNs evolved into arguably the most effective A/S platform; however,
while the RCN pushed hard to acquire them in the late 1950s, the Canadian
government considered them beyond its means. In another example, in 1959
the U.S. Navy formed Task Group (TG) Alfa to evaluate new A/S concepts. Consisting of an A/S carrier, a destroyer squadron, A/S submarines, a shore-based
MPA squadron, and abundant research support, Alfa rivaled the capability of
the RCN’s entire Atlantic fleet.61 The resources the U.S. Navy could apply were
unmatched—and in anti-SSG warfare, numbers mattered.
DENUNCIATION
The Seaward Defence Report received mixed reviews when it was evaluated by senior naval and departmental leadership. Since most of the senior RCN leadership
had been involved with the study, it is not surprising that the navy gave it closeto-universal acceptance. The only debate revolved around the recommended
cancelation of the Vancouver-class frigates, a program for which the navy had
fought long and hard; however, the argument for more St. Laurents eventually
won out.62
From there the plan encountered rough seas. When RCN leaders presented
the Seaward Defence Report to senior defense officials in the autumn of 1955, they
asked for an additional twenty-five St. Laurents on top of the fourteen already
approved, as well as funding for surveys for a sound-surveillance system. The
Chiefs of Staff Committee and senior defense officials agreed to the cancelation
of the Vancouvers and endorsed a limited survey plan, but they balked at the
numbers of additional St. Laurents; in a tortuous five-year process, the government ultimately approved only an additional six of the class.63
And that was as good as it got; other elements of the report’s findings encountered heavy criticism from those who had to grant final approval. At an
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October 1955 Chiefs of Staff meeting, Lieutenant General Charles H. Foulkes
and Deputy Minister of National Defence Frank R. Miller, the senior military
and departmental leaders, respectively, questioned the assumptions on which the
naval staff had based its planning, particularly on the likely course of nuclear war.
They thought it “improbable” that the Soviets would deploy missile submarines
to North American waters in advance of any conflict, because of the danger of
provocation, and they noted the uncertainty within NATO about how a nuclear
war actually might unfold. They also were dismayed by the lavish recommendations for additional ships and aircraft, believing the plans were based on numbers
and not actual need. As Deputy Minister Miller put it, “What was required was
a force to do the job rather than a specific number of ships,” with the navy using
“effectiveness as a yardstick rather than numbers when considering the building
programme”; since the new ships were vastly more capable than the old, should
the navy not be able to get by with fewer of them?64
The air force was more critical. The RCAF consistently had questioned the
need for naval aviation in the Canadian context, so it was not surprising that
the chief of the air staff, Air Marshal C. Roy Slemon, opposed the navy’s plans.65
He complained that the RCAF had not been consulted, and insisted that aircraft
alone could support the sound-surveillance systems, negating any need for additional ships. Slemon also noted that, according to his information, the Soviets
would not possess seagoing nuclear-missile technology for another five years—
which, of course, was precisely the window on which the RCN had focused.66
These criticisms crippled the navy’s plans, and the final nail in the coffin was
hammered home a few weeks later when the naval staff sought additional funds
to fulfill some of the measures recommended by the Seaward Defence Report. The
members of the powerful departmental finance committee were unmoved by the
navy’s arguments and rejected a budget increase to cover the cost of additional
St. Laurents or to fulfill any other measures associated with the plan. Although
senior defense officials acknowledged that they were taking a risk in the face of
the SSG threat, the navy’s plan simply was beyond what the government was willing to devote to maritime defense.67
OPERATIONAL TRIALS
If the acquisition and budgetary aspects of the Seaward Defence Report largely
went unachieved, its operational concepts proved enduring. In early 1956, NSHQ
formed the Naval Warfare Study Group to investigate further how the RCN
would fight a war at sea under the agreed NATO strategy, designated M.C. 48.
The new group’s core, including Commodore Raymond and Captain Landymore,
had been influential contributors to the Seaward Defence Committee.68 Foremost among the new group’s aims was determining how to defend against the
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“Principal Threat: Attacks on inland and Coastal targets by submarine-launched
guided missiles with nuclear warheads.” One decision, obviously based on the
deliberations of the Seaward Defence Committee, was to divide the seawarddefense area into three zones: “an inner firing zone (where submarines might fire
[missiles] upon shore targets, a middle combat zone (where submarines might be
destroyed), and an outer harassing zone (where submarines could be prevented
from snorkeling).”69 The distance of the zones from the coast would vary according to conditions, but the idea was to force submarines to snorkel well before they
reached launching positions, to be detected by the sound-surveillance system,
which would cue offensive forces onto the contact.
The RCN tested these concepts in a series of exercises called BEAVERDAM.
More than anything, the exercises revealed the near impossibility of destroying
missile boats before they launched their payloads. BEAVERDAM 3, carried out off
Nova Scotia in March 1959, provided stark evidence of the challenges confronting A/S forces.
The exercise executed the so-called BEARTRAP plan, which anticipated an
emergency situation in which missile attacks from submarines were “imminent.” For this scenario, the plan assumed the SSGs had penetrated the soundsurveillance net to reach their firing positions, with the objective of reducing
Allied “retaliation capacity” by attacking SAC bases, with ports and population
centers secondary targets. “Hostilities are assumed to commence,” the exercise
orders explained, “with the first firm knowledge that a missile has been launched
or with the discovery of a fully surfaced submarine in a position from which
the Primary and Secondary targets could be effectively attacked.” Until those
conditions prevailed, “submerged or snorting intruders can only be tracked and
heckled—no live-load weapon attacks could be pressed home by anti-submarine
forces.”70 By this time it was thought that boats would have to surface for ten
minutes to launch their missiles, and BEARTRAP called for “the concentration of
surface and air forces within what are deemed probable missile launching areas,
in such density as to ensure that a submarine can be observed and attacked within ten minutes of surfacing. This, of course, necessitates some calculated risks
because of limitations imposed by the forces which are expected to be available.
Equal intensity coverage could not be planned throughout the entire CANLANT
area.” For BEAVERDAM III, the exercise was confined to an area amounting to
one-third of the full CANLANT zone, with participating air and surface assets
limited by the same proportion. Three submarines formed Orange, while Blue
comprised the aircraft carrier Bonaventure, nine escorts, three maritime-patrol
squadrons, and Station Fox.71
BEAVERDAM III tested counter-SSG tactics in the so-called inner firing zone,
and the positioning of the Blue forces reflected the Seaward Defence Report’s
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concept of an immediate offensive response. In line with how it was thought the
Soviets would mount such an operation, the three Orange submarines, HMS Alderney and Ambush and USS Redfin, targeted specific U.S. air bases: Redfin was
to hit Loring Air Force Base (AFB) in northeast Maine; Ambush was assigned
Ernest Harmon AFB at Stephenville, Newfoundland; and Alderney targeted
Argentia Naval Air Station on Newfoundland’s south coast.72 It was thought that
SSGs would have to approach to within visibility range of a geographic feature
such as a headland to fix their position to input accurate navigational guidance
for their missiles; accordingly, Blue surface groups were deployed on either
“fixing point patrols” off obvious landmarks or “surface force patrols” in highprobability launch areas farther out to sea. Blue-force MPAs saturated the same
areas. Bonaventure, with CS2F Trackers embarked, was positioned to seaward of
the MPA patrols; the carrier was escorted by only a single plane-guard destroyer,
since planners assumed an SSG would avoid attacking such a target before hostilities broke out.73
The main aim of BEAVERDAM III was to determine whether an MPA orbiting
within ten minutes’ flight time of a surfaced SSG could detect and attack it before
it launched its missiles. The postexercise analysis declared that “a measure of
success was achieved”; however, that measure was small indeed. Of the eighteen
opportunities MPAs had to detect surfaced submarines during the three phases
of the exercise, two boats were detected within two minutes and killed, another
was killed during the ten-minute launch window, another kill occurred just after
launch, and in two instances air patrols prevented boats from surfacing. Thus,
only three launches definitely were thwarted—which meant that as many as fifteen nuclear-armed missiles rocketed toward their targets.74
The performance of the surface groups was even more dismal. Most ships
failed to approach within a dozen miles of a submarine, and in the one close
encounter, although Ambush sighted the new destroyer Restigouche through its
periscope when passing within 2,800 yards, the ship’s sonar failed to detect the
SSG. Two summaries give a flavor of the encounters. At 0950 on 12 March:
Alderney surfaced in position 44-44N 59-36W, and at 1000 simulated firing her first
missile at Argentia. Assessed as a successful missile launch. This launch was made
22 miles from the center of Area 2, in the close proximity of a fleet of approximately
30 fishing vessels. The area was being surveyed by Summerside Neptune Y4X04. At
1025, Alderney surfaced in the same position and at 1035 simulated firing her second
missile at St. John’s, NFLD. Assessed as a successful missile launch.

At about the same time:
Ambush surfaced in position 43-45N 59-36W, and at 1003 simulated firing her first
missile at Stephenville. Assessed successful missile launch. This launch was made 7
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miles from the center of Area 3 which was being surveyed by Bonaventure Tracker 34
Dressing Room. Ambush dived and surfaced again at 1018 to prepare her second missile for launch at 1031. She sighted Bonaventure Tracker 34 Dressing Room closing
90 seconds before scheduled launch time; however, Ambush remained on the surface,
altered end-on to the aircraft, and simulated firing on schedule, again at Stephenville.
She dived immediately on firing and was attacked with depth charges 30 seconds
after submerging. 34 Dressing Room attack assessed possible kill.75

The exercise analysis found numerous reasons why the SSGs carried out their
missions virtually unscathed. The notoriously poor ocean environment off Nova
Scotia hindered the performance of sonar; the dozens of fishing vessels in the
area clogged radar screens and provided cover for submarines; aircraft failed to
use ECM; and communication between ships and aircraft was poor or nonexistent. Interestingly, although it was thought that poor weather would hamper not
only the MPAs but the SSGs as well, the submarines still were able to fix their
launch positions from features ashore. “Consequently, even though adverse conditions appear to create a stalemate, any reliance upon unfavorable circumstances
to discourage missile attacks, would be wishful thinking.”76
The grim results of BEAVERDAM III were mirrored in other exercises in the
series. This suggested that any optimism about defeating SSGs was itself “wishful
thinking.”
TO THE FUTURE
Appearing before Congress in 1958, American naval leaders warned of the
gravity of the SSG threat. Rear Admiral Hyman G. Rickover, Assistant Chief for
Nuclear Propulsion at the Bureau of Ships, testified as follows:
We know [the Soviets] have operational missiles which are good for at least 200 miles
and probably more. I would anticipate that in the not too distant future they will
have operational missiles with a range of up to 600 to 700 miles. Therefore, with a
large number of submarines that can carry missiles fitted with atomic or hydrogen
warheads, they have the capacity to operate off our coasts and destroy our cities. . . .
[This] is the gravest immediate threat that faces the United States.77

The threat was indeed ominous, but a lot of flesh had been put on the bones
of solutions to the SSG problem since the RCN had produced the Seaward Defence Report three years earlier. Intelligence had a firmer grasp of Soviet strategy
and capability; sound-surveillance systems maintained their abundant promise;
tactics had matured, through exercises such as BEAVERDAM III; and new and
evolving countermeasures—such as A/S submarines, the Jezebel passive acoustic
processor, magnetic anomaly detection, Julie explosive echo ranging, and nuclear
depth charges—had increased the probability of killing missile boats. Canadian
maritime forces and the U.S. Navy also arrived at a unified strategy to deal with
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the SSG problem.78 Against that, the Soviets were ready to deploy their first wave
of SSGs with more-advanced missiles, and had developed another potentially
devastating weapon in the nuclear torpedo.79
Yet despite the relentless march of measure and countermeasure, the basic
contentions introduced in the Seaward Defence Report remained valid. Any hope
of intercepting SSGs before they launched their missiles required a reliable, longrange means of detecting them and the ability to respond quickly and decisively
to the information.
When the Cold War threatened to explode during the tense weeks of October–
November 1962’s Cuban missile crisis, Canadian maritime forces used the concepts of the Seaward Defence Report to defend the eastern seaboard of North
America. MPAs saturated potential submarine launch positions, while surface
groups were positioned to provide offensive support to the sound-surveillance
arrays at Shelburne and Argentia; later in the crisis Canadian sea- and airborne
forces moved south to help defend U.S. assets.80 Although it is unknown whether
the Soviets deployed SSGs or other boats into the Canadian northwest Atlantic
during the crisis (current research suggests they did not), if they did so Canadian
maritime forces, by implementing the concepts of the Seaward Defence Report
and working seamlessly with their USN allies, were at least well positioned to
intercept them; whether they could have destroyed them before the critical moment of missile launch is another question.81
Nonetheless, using the information at their disposal at the dawn of the SSG
threat, the authors of the RCN “new look” delivered a sound, innovative defensive
concept. And that concept proved adaptable and enduring.
The process of formulating a seaward-defense plan in the shadow of an emerging
nuclear threat, as well as the operational concept at which naval planners arrived,
has utility beyond the scope of this article. In terms of the planning process, three
avenues for further analysis present themselves.
First, what does the RCN and USN response to the SSG threat say about the
two services’ ability to handle dynamic strategic and tactical circumstances? In
particular, the U.S. Navy has served as a useful model of how such institutions
deal with change; and, depending on the availability of historic documentation,
an examination of its organizational response to the ASW challenges confronting
it in the 1950s could be instructive in this regard.82
Second, the stark contrast between the resources the two navies could apply
to the SSG problem would make for useful analysis into how organizations with
varying levels of fiscal, political, and public support cope with such dynamic
change. Small- and medium-size navies such as the RCN simply cannot adjust to
such circumstances in the same way the U.S. Navy can. Given that the U.S. Navy
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has striven to enhance relationships with allies—to build what one CNO referred
to as a “thousand-ship navy”—comparative analysis of how such relationships
might be affected by the inability of other navies to meet change at the same pace
as their American ally—which could result in a critical “capability gap”—would
seem germane.83
Finally, the measures of the seaward defense plan and the application of the
forces potentially involved invite study in terms of their viability in the face of
some of the challenges facing today’s naval planners. For instance, since aspects
of the plan can be applied to the notion of antiaccess warfare, it can be used to
weigh both defensive and offensive perspectives of the concept.84
In the end, it is probably best that we do not know whether the seaward defense plan, or any similar plan, would have been successful if tested by actual
nuclear attack. Nonetheless, studying the plan has value in both the historical
and contemporary contexts.
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